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III. THE EMPIRE 29I 
M. PEACHIN, IUDEX VICE CAESARIS: DEPUTY EMPERORS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
YUSTICEDURING THE PRINCIPATE. (Heidelberger althistorische Beitraige und epigraphische Studien 
21). Stuttgart: Steiner, I996. Pp. X + 267. ISBN 3-515-o6772-8. DM 88. 
Michael Peachin examines the phenomenon of private individuals delegated to hear cases in the 
emperor's stead, from its first appearance under Septimius Severus until its regularization as one of 
the duties of high officials under Constantine. P. begins by demonstrating the imperial justice 
system's inherent tendency to generate appeals. P. argues that the hierarchy of courts, with the 
emperor at its head, increasingly based on cognitio extra ordinem, combined with the presiding 
officials' lack of legal expertise, allowed more scope for appeal than the traditional formulary 
procedure, thus inevitably increasing the emperor's judicial burden. P. adds an impressive list of 
legal matters for which the emperor's personal decision was essential (84-6). Delegation of the 
imperial cognitio (hearing of cases in person) thus appears a rational response. 
Our knowledge of the function of the substitutes derives solely from their (variable) titulature; 
e.g. electus ad cognoscendum vice Caesaris cognitiones (ILS ii86). P. collates the thirteen known 
iudices, amongst whom predominate 'Italians, patricians, sons or grandsons of consuls', of consular 
rank themselves, and hence appropriately distinguished to substitute for the emperor (I40-53). 
None exhibits evidence of specific legal training, simply ample experience of general administration, 
naturally involving copious amounts of dispute resolution. P. argues convincingly that most were 
appointed to deal with judicial business still being focused on Rome despite the emperor's absence. 
Pace P., the same circumstance may underlie the rarer provincial examples, since all but one of these 
were appointed in the wake of an imperial presence. P. also ascribes to some iudices the additional 
power to issue rescripts to libelli from private individuals, examples of which he detects in the Cy 
(227-8), and to others even a wider-ranging supra-provincial authority in their capacity as iudices 
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vice Caesaris (172-82). This stretches the evidence too far. Nevertheless, P. has formulated a thesis 
that must be considered by any serious historian of the imperial administration. 
University College London R. W. B. SALWAY 
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